

QUINTILIAN ON THE ΚΛΙΣΙΣ ΧΡΕΙΑΣ

A visit to the class of the *grammaticus**

According to Quintilian,¹ the task of the *grammaticus* or secondary school teacher is twofold: the instruction of the principles of correct speech and the interpretation of literary texts. After dealing with both topics in 1. 4–7 and 1. 8 of his *Institutio Oratoria*, he adds in 1. 9 *quaedam dicendi primordia* (“certain elementary rules of speaking”) to the teaching load of the grammarian. This includes the most basic exercises of what later rhetorical tradition termed *progymnasmata*: a series of preliminary compositional exercises in rhetoric, arranged in order of increasing difficulty and intended to prepare students for declamation. Several Greek manuals containing such preparatory material have been preserved: Aelius Theon (1st cent. AD); (ps.-)Hermogenes (2nd–4th cent. AD); Aphthonius (4th cent. AD); Nicolaus (5th cent. AD). They define and classify – with some variations in the number, sequence or names of the exercises involved – the following *progymnasmata*: fable (μῦθος), narrative or narration (διήγημα / διήγησις), anecdote (χρεία), maxim (γνώμη), refutation (ἀνασκευή), confirmation (κατασκευή), topic or commonplace (τόπος; κοινὸς τόπος), encomium (ἐγκώμιον), in-

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¹ Unless otherwise stated, for Quintilian the English translation by Russell is used: Quintilian, *The Orator’s Education*. Ed. and transl. by D. A. Russell (Cambridge, Mass.– London 2001). For the texts of Theon, (ps.-)Hermogenes, Aphthonius and Nicolaus the English translation by Kennedy is used: G. A. Kennedy (ed.), *Progymnasmata. Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric*. Writings from the Greco-Roman World 10 (Atlanta 2003).

The following editions are referred to by sigla only:

F = *Nicolai Progymnasmata*, ed. I. Felten, *Rhetores Graeci XI* (Lipsiae 1913);

P = Aelius Théon, *Progymnasmata*, texte établi et trad. par M. Patillon (Paris 1997);

R = *Hermogenis opera*, ed. H. Rabe. *Rhetores Graeci VI* (Lipsiae 1913);

Sp = *Rhetores Graeci II*, ex recognitione L. Spengel (Frankfurt/Main 1966 [1854]);

GL = *Grammatici Latini*, ex recensione H. Keilii (Lipsiae 1855–1880).

vective (ψόγος), comparison (σύγκρισις), characterization or personification (ἔθοποιία; προσωποποιία), description (ἔκφρασις), (defence or refutation of a) proposition (θέσις) and (introduction of a) law (νόμος).

In the Roman school system most of these exercises, though actually belonging to the domain of rhetoric, seem to have gradually shifted to the domain of the *grammaticus*.² Quintilian, unsatisfied with the intrusion of the grammarians into the teaching subjects of their superior colleagues, reacts against this evolution and proposes a neat division between the two stages, which leaves only the most elementary initial rhetorical exercises to the grammar school:³ fable (*fabella*, 1. 9, § 2), paraphrase (*paraphrasis*, §§ 2–3), maxim (*sententia*, § 3), anecdote (*chria*, §§ 3–5), “saying to which a reason is appended” (*aetiologia*) or description of character (*ethologia*, § 3, cf. *infra* p. 249), and short narrative based on the poets (*narratiuncula*, § 6, cf. *infra* p. 249).⁴ Unfortunately, his presentation of the content of these basic rhetorical exercises is often so brief⁵ that it causes several problems of interpretation to modern scholars.

Two major problematic passages concern the exercises (1) *aetiologia/ethologia* and (2) *narratiuncula*. In view of the arguments put forward later on in this paper, we provide here a short *status quaestionis*:

² A. Wouters (“The κλίσις χρείας: between the grammarian and the rhetorician” [forthcoming]) points out that in the Greek education system of the 1st–2nd century AD all these *progymnasmata*, except for – at least after Theon – the declension of a χρεῖα (cf. *infra*), still belonged to the domain of the *rhetor*. Cf. also: R. Webb, “The *Progymnasmata* as Practice”, in: Y. L. Too (ed.), *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity* (Leiden – Boston – Köln 2001) 296–297. As Quintilian (1. 9. 6) observes, *Graeci magis operum suorum et onera et modum norunt* (“the Greek [rhetoricians] know the burdens and the limits of their work better”).

³ Cf. also: T. Viljamaa, “From Grammar to Rhetoric. First Exercises in Composition According to Quintilian, *Inst.* 1, 9”, *Arctos* 22 (1988) 182–184.

⁴ Two of these *primordia dicendi* are not listed in the extant Greek manuals: the paraphrase and the *aetiologia* or *ethologia*. The passages in which both exercises occur, however, cause some problems of textual criticism and interpretation. For problems related to the former exercise, cf., e. g.: E. N. O’Neil, “Discussion of Preliminary Exercises of *Marcus Fabius Quintilianus*. Introduction, Translation and Comments”, in: R. F. Hock, E. N. O’Neil (eds.), *The Chreia in Ancient Rhetoric. I. The Progymnasmata, Texts and Translations 27* (Atlanta 1986) 119–120, and Viljamaa (n. 3) 187–189.

⁵ Quintilian is conscious of this, as he says at the beginning of 1. 10: *Haec de grammaticae, quam brevissime potui, non ut omnia dicerem sectatus, quod infinitum erat, sed ut maxime necessaria* (“I have been as concise as possible in this discussion of *grammaticae*, making no attempt to mention everything – that would have been an endless task – but selecting the most essential points”).

(1) Do we have to accept in § 3 the reading *aetiologia*⁶ or *ethologia*⁷? Although only *aetiologia* has manuscript authority, many editors of Quintilian prefer – probably wrongly – *ethologia*, introduced as an emendation by Raphaël Regius in 1493. Secondly, what is the meaning of both terms? *Ethologia*, which is only attested indisputably in Seneca (*Epist.* 95. 65) and Charisius (GL I, 284. 12; 4th cent. AD), possibly refers to a succinct description of the conduct and morals of a virtuous or vicious character.⁸ *Aetiologia* as a rhetorical *schema* or figure occurs several times in grammatical and rhetorical writers⁹ to indicate the addition of a reason or rationale (αἰτία) to a statement. Quintilian too mentions this term in his discussion of the figures of speech (9. 3. 93): *Quod vero schema est ad propositum subiecta ratio, quod Rutilius αἰτιολογίαν vocat?* (“And what sort of Figure is this ‘reason added to a proposition’ which Rutilius [i. e. the 1st century AD rhetorician Rutilius Lupus in his *Schem. dian. et lex.*, 2. 19] calls *aitiologia*?”). As a school exercise besides *sententia* and *chria*, *aetiologia* has probably the same or in any case a similar content: a saying to which a reason or cause is appended.

(2) What is the position of the *narratiuncula* within the framework of the *primordia dicendi* and how does it relate to the *narratio* in 2. 4, one of the *progymnasmata* to be dealt with by the rhetor? In 1. 9. 6 Quintilian gives the following information about this exercise: *narratiunculas a poetis celebratas notitiae causa, non eloquentiae tractandas puto* (“short narratives found in the poets should, in my view, be taught for general knowledge, not for developing eloquence”). In 2. 4. 2, after distinguishing three types of narratives (sc. fable or purely fictional story [*fabula*], plot or fictional story with the appearance of truth [*argumentum*], and history or story of real events [*historia*]), he adds: *grammaticis autem poeticas dedimus: apud rhetorem initium sit historica, tanto robustior quanto verior* (“we have given poetical Narratives to the *grammatici*; the rhetor should begin with historical ones, which are more grown-up because they are more real”). This passage makes it very probable that *narratiunculas a poetis celebratas* refer to short *narrationes* of the first two types, borrowed from poems and tragedies or comedies.¹⁰ But what then is the content of the *narratiuncula*-exercise? According to Colson¹¹ the information provided by Quintilian on this point is to be interpreted as

⁶ Cf., e. g.: R. P. Robinson, “*Ethologia* or *Aetiologia* in Suetonius *De Grammaticis* c. 4, and Quintilian i. 9”, *CPh* 15 (1920) 370–379; F. H. Colson, “Quintilian I. 9 and the ‘Chria’ in Ancient Education”, *CR* 35 (1921) 152 and id., *M. Fabii Quintiliani Institutionis Oratoriae liber I*. Ed. with introduction and commentary (Cambridge 1924) 117–119; J. Cousin, *Etudes sur Quintilien. I. Contribution à la recherche des sources de l’Institution Oratoire*. PhD. (Paris 1935) 81 n. 6; S. F. Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome. From the Elder Cato to the Younger Pliny* (London 1977) 258; O’Neil (n. 4) 122–128; I. H. Henderson, “Quintilian and the *Progymnasmata*”, *Antike und Abendland* 37 (1991) 96–98; P xiii.

⁷ Cf., e. g.: G. L. Spalding (ed.), *M. Fabius Quintilianus De Institutione Oratoria libri duodecim I* (Hildesheim 1969 [1798]) 206–207; Viljamaa (n. 3) 193–200; R. Granatelli, “M. Fabio Quintiliano Institutio oratoria II 1–10: struttura e problemi interpretativi”, *Rhetorica* 13 (1995): 2, 138 and 144–145; Russell (n. 1) 210–211 n. 4.

⁸ Viljamaa (n. 3) 197–200.

⁹ Cf.: Robinson (n. 6) 372–373; O’Neil (n. 4) 125; H. Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik* (Stuttgart 1990) 430–431, §§ 867–871.

¹⁰ Cf., e. g.: O’Neil (n. 4) 128–129.

¹¹ Colson (n. 6 [1924]) 121.

follows: “‘Narratio’ is only to be employed in the grammatical schools as a test of knowledge and to familiarise them with the stories and not as a regular progymnasma”. In addition he states that, since at the level of the rhetor students should start working with historical texts to improve their compositional skills, narrative composition based on mythological or literary fiction seems to have been considered unsuitable for both schools by Quintilian. Viljamaa¹² in our opinion rightly rejects this interpretation. In his view the words *narratiunculas ... puto* indicate that Quintilian thinks short poetic narratives should be practised in grammar school, but only in the form of simple reproductions, without any rhetorical embellishment including, for example, amplification or refutation. Quintilian thus divides the διήγημα or *narratio* between two different educational levels. This is especially emphasized by Henderson.¹³

The present article, underpinning a suggestion made by Wouters in a forthcoming article,¹⁴ intends to contribute to the elucidation of another problematic passage.

I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM

The passage in question concerns the preliminary rhetorical exercise called *chria* (χρεία) (1. 9. 5):

In his omnibus (sc. chriis) et declinatio per eosdem ducitur casus et tam factorum quam dictorum ratio est.

As the following translations illustrate, this sentence has hitherto been interpreted in different ways:

All these instances are couched in the same grammatical form and deeds no less than sayings may be presented for treatment (Butler).¹⁵

In all these (sc. *chriae*), too, declension is done in the same cases, and the method is the same for both action-*chreiai* and sayings-*chreiai* (O’Neil).¹⁶

En todas estas clases de crías la digresión tiene lugar en las mismas formas de declamación y existe fundamento tanto para los hechos como para los dichos (Ortega Carmona).¹⁷

All these (sc. *chriae*) can be declined through the same range of cases, and the principle applies to *Chriae* based on actions as well as those based on words (Russell).¹⁸

¹² Viljamaa (n. 3) 190; cf. Bonner (n. 6) 260–261.

¹³ Henderson (n. 6) 92 and 94.

¹⁴ Cf. supra n. 2.

¹⁵ *The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian*, with an English transl. by H. E. Butler I (London – Cambridge, Mass. 1963 [1920]).

¹⁶ O’Neil (n. 4) 134.

¹⁷ Quintiliano de Calahorra. *Sobre la formación del orador. Edición bilingüe: latín-español*. Trad. y com. de A. Ortega Carmona I (Salamanca 1997).

¹⁸ Russell (n. 1).

The meaning of the first part of the sentence (*in his ... casus*) is clear. As far as we know, Butler in 1920 and Ortega Carmona in 1997 were the only ones who failed¹⁹ to see that Quintilian is alluding here plainly to the exercise called κλίσις χρείας ('declension of a *chria*' [cf. *infra* II. 3]).²⁰

The second part of the sentence, however, causes difficulties. More specifically, it is the meaning of the word *ratio* that troubles modern scholars. Having a broad semantic field and being used by Quintilian himself in different meanings, this word has given rise to several interpretations. If we look at the translations presented above, the term is understood as *treatment, method, foundation, or principle*, the second being further explained by O'Neil as the method of adding several introductory formulas to *chriae* in order to make their declension possible.²¹ A more complete and detailed list of the meanings proposed so far will be given below, followed by a discussion of both our own interpretation and that of other scholars. But it may be useful first to offer a general outline of the nature of the *chria*-exercise.²²

II. THE XPEIA

1. definition

To begin with, what is a *chria*? Quintilian, assuming that his readers were familiar with this kind of anecdote,²³ does not explain the term, but the

¹⁹ The former explicitly indicates this in an additional note to his translation ([n. 15] 158, n. 1): "the sense is not clear: it appears to refer to the stereotyped form in which the *chria* was couched". Why the latter gives *declinatio* and *casus* the meaning of 'digression' and 'forms of declamation' respectively, remains, however, unclear. Is he alluding here vaguely to the elaboration of a *chria* (cf. *infra* II. 5)? Cf. Rahn (Marcus Fabius Quintilianus. *Ausbildung des Redners. Zwölf Bücher*. Hrsg. und übers. von H. Rahn [Darmstadt 1972]), who translates *casus* in a similar way, viz. 'Deklamationsformen'.

²⁰ Spalding already ([n. 7] 208, *ad* 'declinatio – ducitur') linked the passage involved to this kind of exercise.

²¹ O'Neil (n. 4) 135 (cf. *infra* II. 3).

²² For a more detailed description of this school exercise, cf.: Bonner (n. 6) 256–260; Hock, O'Neil (n. 4); *idd.*, *The Chreia and Ancient Rhetoric. Classroom Exercises*, Writings from the Greco-Roman World 2 (Atlanta 2002); Lausberg (n. 9) 536–540; Wouters (n. 2).

²³ For the origin and popularity of the *chria*, cf., e. g.: R. F. Hock, "General Introduction to Volume I", in: Hock, O'Neil (n. 4) 3–9. The *chria* was used not only in an educational context: as a literary form it had existed long before it was introduced into the classroom (*ibid.*, 3).

extant Greek progymnasmatic manuals or *Progymnasmata* all offer a definition. Theon for example defines *χρεία* as follows:

Χρεία ἐστὶ σύντομος ἀπόφασις ἢ πράξις μετ' εὐστοχίας ἀναφερομένη εἰς τι ὀρισμένον πρόσωπον ἢ ἀναλογοῦν πρόσωπον (96. 19–21 P).

A *chreia* is a brief saying or action making a point,²⁴ attributed to some specified person or something corresponding to a person.²⁵

A specific feature of the *χρεία* that is included by (ps.-)Hermogenes (6. 5–6 R) and Nicolaus (19. 9 F) in their definitions is its usefulness for life, which is in fact also implied by the term itself,²⁶ although, as Theon and (ps.-)Hermogenes indicate, a *χρεία* can also be ἄχρηστος.²⁷ To quote only one example of a 'useful' *χρεία* among the 68 *χρεῖαι* catalogued by Hock and O'Neil:²⁸

Ἴσοκράτης ἔφησε τῆς παιδείας τὴν μὲν ρίζαν εἶναι πικράν, τὸν δὲ καρπὸν γλυκύν.

Isocrates said that education's root is bitter, its fruit is sweet (Hock, O'Neil).

²⁴ See on the contrary Hock ([n. 23] 25), who accepts that εὐστοχία refers to the aptness in the correspondence between the saying (or action) and the character ("aptly attributed to some specified person").

²⁵ For a plausible interpretation of ἀναλογοῦν πρόσωπον, cf. P 133 n. 120: "Ce que Théon désigne comme 'l'équivalent d'un personnage' correspond probablement à ce qu'Hermogène [...] appelle la personne indéfinie (ἀόριστον πρόσωπον) et dont il donne comme exemple l'indéfini τις".

²⁶ Cf. Aphthonius (23. 3–4 Sp): *χρειώδης δὲ οὖσα προσαγορεύεται χρεία* ("it is called *chreia* because it is useful"). See also Theon (97. 7–10 P) and Nicolaus (20. 1–5 F). That this exercise is called after the current meaning of *χρεία* ('usefulness') as the progymnasmatic authors state, is probably not correct (Colson [n. 6 (1921)] 150): *χρεία* can also mean 'an apposite remark'. Viljamaa ([n. 3] 191) combines the two meanings in his explanation of the term: "Evidently it was named the *chreia* by reason of its suitability for apposite descriptions as well as because of its usefulness for moral and rhetorical teaching."

²⁷ (Ps.-)Hermogenes (6. 5–6 R) says that the *χρεία* is "generally" useful, implying that it does not always have to bear this mark. Theon (96. 29–30 P) remarks that a *chreia* sometimes contains a pleasantry or wit not useful for life. Nicolaus (21. 1–18 F) on the contrary notices that a *χρεία* can be both witty and useful at the same time (cf.: B. L. Mack, E. N. O'Neil, "The *Chreia* Discussion of *Hermogenes of Tarsus*. Introduction, Translation and Comments", in: Hock, O'Neil [n. 4] 179 n. 3). In any case, as Colson observes ([n. 6 (1921)] 150), not all *χρεῖαι* handed down to us can be regarded as useful for life. The reason why they are generally considered to be useful, is probably the fact that in earlier times they were mostly used in a philosophical context (*ibid.*, 150).

²⁸ Hock, O'Neil (n. 4) 297–345, sc. no. 43.

2. classification

The *chriae* are grouped into three classes by the progymnasmatic textbooks: λογικαί, πρακτικαί and μικταὶ χρεῖαι, which cover (1) χρεῖαι involving a speech or saying (λόγος, or ἀπόφασις in the *chria*-definition of Theon), (2) an action (πρᾶξις), and (3) a mixture of both. The Isocrates-*chria* quoted above belongs to the first type. As an example of a πρακτικὴ χρεία Quintilian mentions (1.9.5):

Crates, cum indoctum puerum vidisset, paedagogum eius percussit.

When Crates saw an ill-educated boy, he beat his *paedagogus*.

Quintilian is apparently familiar with the distinction made by the progymnasmatic tradition between sayings- and action-*chriae*: the actions (*facta*) and words (*dicta*) mentioned in the second part of his statement about the *chria*-exercise, viz. *et tam factorum quam dictorum ratio est*, refer to πρακτικαί and λογικαί χρεῖαι respectively.²⁹ However, he nowhere mentions the third class of mixed *chriae*. To find an illustration of this category, we have to return to the *Progymnasmata*. Nicolaus gives the following example (20.16–17 F):

Λάκων ἐρωτηθείς, ποῦ τὰ τεῖχη τῆς Σπάρτης, ἀνατείνας τὸ δόρυ ἔφη ἐνταῦθα.

When a Laconian was asked where the walls of Sparta were, holding up his spear (action!), he said, ‘There’ (saying!).³⁰

²⁹ Another passage which indicates Quintilian’s familiarity with both classes of *chriae* is the following (1.9.5): *etiam in ipsorum factis esse chrian putant* (“a *Chria* may also, it is thought, consist only of the subject’s action”). After having enumerated several types of sayings-*chriae*, Quintilian with these words, which immediately precede the Crates-*chria* quoted above, turns to the second class of πρακτικαὶ χρεῖαι (cf. also infra n. 34). For *ipsorum*, referring either to the personae of the preceding types of *chriae* or to the preceding types themselves, cf.: Spalding (n. 7) 208, *ad* ‘ipsorum factis’; Colson (n. 6 [1924]) 120; O’Neil (n. 4) 131–132; Henderson (n. 6) 95.

³⁰ We must make a distinction, however, between Theon’s concept of a mixed χρεία and that of the other progymnasmatic authors. According to the former (99.5–7 P), the protagonist of a μικτὴ χρεία only acts, the saying being implied in the question or circumstance which brings about the action. For the latter (Herm. 6.12–14 R; Aphth. 23.10–13 Sp; Nic. 20.15–17 F) the persona of a mixed *chria* produces both an action and a saying (cf. Hock [n. 23] 27–28). Since one of Theon’s examples to illustrate the mixed *chria* is the same as that given by Nicolaus (99.10–12 P), it is helpful to quote it here too, in order to mark the difference in concept: Λάκων ἐρομένου τινὸς αὐτὸν ποῦ τοὺς ὄρους τῆς γῆς ἔχουσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἔδειξε τὸ δόρυ (“A Laco-

This threefold division of *chriai* into λογικαί, πρακτικαί and μικταί χρεῖαι contains several subdivisions. By far the most detailed classification is transmitted by Theon (97. 11–99. 12 P).³¹ He subdivides the sayings-*chriai* further into ἀποφαντικαί (*declarative*), ἀποκριτικαί (*responsive*) and διπλαῖ (*double*) χρεῖαι,³² and, in turn, the first two of these categories into several subclasses. In addition he is the only progymnastic author who makes a distinction between ἐνεργητικαί (*active*) and παθητικαί (*passive*) action-*chriai*, viz. *chriai* describing an act (like the example of Crates above), and *chriai* indicating something experienced.³³

Quintilian too lists different types of *chriai*,³⁴ but, partly due to its concision, scholars have difficulties to bring his discussion of *chriai* into line

nian, when someone asked him where the Lacedaimonians set the limits of their land [saying], showed his spear [action]”). The other progymnastic authors would have placed this example in the category of πρακτικαί χρεῖαι, as the Laconian does not say anything, but only shows his spear.

³¹ Aphthonius (23. 4–5 Sp) only mentions the principal division. (Ps.-)Hermogenes (7. 7–9 R) and Nicolaus (22. 21–23. 5 F) merely allude to a few subdivisions (cf. Hock [n. 23] 27).

³² Ἀποφαντικαί χρεῖαι include statements which are made voluntarily by the speaker (“Diogenes used to say...”) or which are based on what the speaker sees, related to a certain circumstance (“Diogenes, while seeing..., said”). Ἀποκριτικαί χρεῖαι are χρεῖαι which are made in response to a question (“Diogenes, when asked..., said”). Διπλαῖ χρεῖαι consist of two statements, made by two different persons (“Alexander said... and Diogenes replied...”).

³³ E. g., Theon 99. 2–4 P: Διδύμων ὁ ἀύλητῆς ἀλοὺς ἐπὶ μοιχείᾳ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐκρεμάσθη (“Didymon the flute player, taken in adultery, was hung by his name”); for the meaning of this *chria*, cf.: D. N. Sedley, “Pythagoras the Grammar Teacher (PBrLibrAddMs 37 516, 1)”, in: *Papiri Filosofici. Miscellanea di Studi*. II (Firenze 1998) 177–181 (= Sedley 1998a) and id., “Pythagoras the Grammar Teacher and Didymon the Adulterer”, *Hyperboreus* 4 (1998): 1, 132–136 (= Sedley 1998b).

³⁴ 1. 9. 4–5: *Chriarum plura genera traduntur: unum simile sententiae, quod est positum in voce simplici: ‘dixit ille’ aut ‘dicere solebat’; alterum quod est in respondendo: ‘interrogatus ille’, vel ‘cum hoc ei dictum esset, respondit’; tertium huic non dissimile: ‘cum quis dixisset aliquid’ vel ‘fecisset’. Etiam in ipsorum factis esse chrian putant, ut: ‘Crates, cum indoctum puerum vidisset, paedagogum eius percussit’, et aliud paene par ei, quod tamen eodem nomine appellare non audent, sed dicunt χρετιῶδες, ut: ‘Milo, quem vitulum adsueverat ferre, taurum ferebat’* (“As to *Chriai*, there are several sorts of these; one is akin to Aphorism and rests on a simple statement: ‘he said’ or ‘he used to say’; another includes an answer: ‘being asked’ or ‘when this was said to him, he answered’. There is a third type, much the same: ‘when someone said’ – or ‘did’ – ‘something’. A *Chria* may also, it is thought, consist only of the subject’s action: ‘When Crates saw an ill-educated boy, he beat his *paedagogus*’. A very similar example – which they do not venture to call a *Chria*

with the progymnasmatic tradition. While Schissel³⁵ has stressed the likeness of Quintilian's classification system to that of Theon, O'Neil³⁶ and Henderson³⁷ – though each from a different point of view³⁸ – emphasize its independence from the *Progymnasmata*. It is not our intention, however, to investigate this matter more fully here.

3. the κλίσις χρείας: content

In ancient rhetorical education³⁹ *chriae* were used in different ways to train the compositional skills and speech abilities of the students. Theon mentions a series of eight exercises on the χρεία (101. 3–6 P):

Γυμνάζονται δὲ κατὰ τὰς χρείας τῇ ἀπαγγελίᾳ τῇ κλίσει τῇ ἐπιφωνήσει τῇ ἀντιλογίᾳ, ἐπεκτείνομεν τε καὶ συστέλλομεν τὴν χρείαν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀνασκευάζομεν καὶ κατασκευάζομεν.

Chreias are practiced by restatement, grammatical inflection, comment, and contradiction, and we expand and compress the chreia, and in addition (at a later stage in study) we refute and confirm.

but say it is 'of the Chria type' – is 'Milo carried a grown bull which he had been used to carry as a calf'").

³⁵ O. Schissel, "Die Einteilung der Chrie bei Quintilian", *Hermes* 68 (1933) 245–248. Colson's commentary (n. 6 [1924] 119–120, *passim*) is marked by a similar approach.

³⁶ O'Neil (n. 4) 129–134.

³⁷ Henderson (n. 6) 95–96.

³⁸ According to O'Neil, Quintilian merely lists some types of *chriae* without a sense of precision, due to the fact that the classification of the *chria* had not yet been given a set form in the 1st century AD and that he was apparently unaware of Theon's elaborate classification system. In Henderson's opinion (p. 95), on the other hand, Quintilian's classification is a useful and coherent system, structured around a criterion of division other than that of Theon.

³⁹ At the level of the γραμματοδιδάσκαλος or primary school teacher, *chriae* served as reading and writing exercises, providing pupils at the same time with a "minimal cultural package" (cf.: R. Criboire, *Gymnastics of the Mind. Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt* [Princeton 2001] 178) and with some moral values (cf.: T. Morgan, *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds* [Cambridge 1998] 120–151 [ch. 4: *Maxims and morals*]). Cf. for example schoolbook *P. Bour.* 1 (4th cent. AD), which contains, besides other elementary school exercises, five *chriae* attributed to Diogenes [ed. pr.: P. Jouguet, P. Perdrizet, "Le Papyrus Bouriant n° 1. Un cahier d'écolier grec d'Égypte", *Studien zur Palaeographie und Papyruskunde* 6 (1906) 148–161; cf. also: R. Criboire, *Writing, Teachers, and Students in Graeco-Roman Egypt* (Atlanta 1996) n° 393; R. F. Hock, "Cynics and Rhetoric", in: S. E. Porter (ed.), *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330 B. C.–A. D. 400* (Boston–Leiden 2001 [1997]) 764–765 and Hock, O'Neil (n. 22) 5–12]. For a survey of elementary *chria*-exercises

He then proceeds to describe each of these exercises step by step, paying by far most attention to the κλίσις χρείας (101. 10–103. 2 P). As we have seen above, this is the exercise which Quintilian refers to in his discussion of the *chria*:

in his omnibus et declinatio per eosdem ducitur casus.

all these (sc. *chriae*) can be declined through the same range of cases.

The κλίσις or *declinatio* of a *chria* consists of inflecting the persona (πρόσωπον) of the saying or action through all the cases (*per eosdem ducitur casus*) and numbers.⁴⁰ To make such an inflexion possible, one has always to adapt the rest of the sentence grammatically by inserting a fixed set of introductory phrases or *formulae* into the *chria*, which vary from case to case and sometimes also from *chria*-type to *chria*-type. Theon provides a detailed picture of this. After noticing that the nominative presents no difficulties, since *chriae* are normally cited in that case, he starts with the genitive (101. 30–102. 13 P):

Τὴν δὲ γενικὴν πῶσιν οὕτω κλινοῦμεν· ἐὰν μὲν λογικὴ ἢ ἡ χρεία, προσθήσομεν αὐτῇ· “τὸ ῥηθὲν μνήμης ἔτυχεν”, ἢ “λόγος ἀπομνημονεύεται εἰπόντος” ...

Ἀρμόττει δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ μὲν “λόγος ἀπομνημονεύεται” πάσαις ταῖς λογικαῖς χρεῖαις, πλὴν τῆς καθ’ ἐκούσιον ἀπόφασιν· ταύτη γὰρ “τὸ ῥηθὲν μνήμης ἔτυχεν”. Ἐὰν δὲ πρακτικὴ ἢ χρεία, εἰ μὲν παθητικὴ εἴη, προσθετέον· “τὸ συμβὰν μνήμης ἔτυχεν”. Εἰ δὲ ἐνεργητικὴ “τὸ πραχθὲν μνήμης ἔτυχεν”, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μικτοῦ.

preserved on papyrus, cf. Criboire (1996); Hock (2001) 765 n. 69 (only *chriae* of Diogenes); Hock, O’Neil (n. 22) 1–49.

⁴⁰ We may wonder why Quintilian says nothing about the possibility to inflect *chriae* through the different numbers. Does he avoid the term *numeros* (*per eosdem ... casus et numeros*) consciously to react against this – at least from our point of view – absurd practice to decline proper names through dual and plural (cf. *infra*, our [partial] transcription of a Pythagoras-*chria*)? In the same way Nicolaus seems to have some problems with inflecting a χρεία about Pittacus of Mytilene in dual and plural (18. 23–19. 1 F): εἰ ἐνδέχοιτο τυχὸν διὰ μελέτην δευτέρῳ Πιττακῶ ἢ καὶ πλείοσιν ἀνατιθέναι τὸν λόγον (“if it is possible for the sake of practice perhaps to attribute the statement to two or more Pittacuses”). The Latin grammarian Diomedes (4th cent. AD) in his general presentation of the exercise also remains silent about the number (GL I, 310. 2: *chriarum exercitatio in casus sic variatur* [“the exercise with *chriae* is transformed as follows in the various cases”]), but nevertheless gives an illustration of a *chria*-declension through singular and plural (cf. also *infra*).

We practice the genitive as follows. If the chreia is a saying, we shall add to it that “The saying has become memorable”, or “The story is remembered of X saying...” ...

“The story is remembered” well fits all chreias about a saying except for a volunteered⁴¹ statement; for that use “The saying of X... has become memorable”.

If the chreia describes an action, and if that is passive, one should add, “The experience of X... has become memorable”; if it is active, “The action of X... has become memorable”, and similarly in the case of a mixed chreia.

In the dative, he continues, one must add to all types of *chriae* “ἔδοξεν” (“it seemed best”), “ἐφάνη” (“it appeared best”), “ἐπῆλθεν” (“it occurred”), “παρέστη” (“it came to mind”) or another similar *formula*, except for the passive action-*chria*, to which the phrase “συνέβη” (“it happened”) has to be attached. For the accusative, on the other hand, the *formulae* “φασί” (“they say”) or “λέγεται” (“it is said”) are generally used. Finally, about the vocative case, Theon says the following (102. 34 – 103. 1 P):

Ἡ δὲ κλητικὴ σαφὴς ἐστὶ ποιησόμεθα γὰρ τὸν λόγον πρὸς τι παρὸν ἡμῖν πρόσωπον, ἐφ’ ὃ ἡ χρεία ἀναφέρεται, οἷον “Διόγενες Κυνικὲ φιλόσοφε, ἰδὼν ...”.

The vocative is clear; for we address the remark to the person to whom the chreia is attributed as though present with us; for example, “O Diogenes, Cynic philosopher, on seeing ...”.

A concrete application of all these rules, coming directly from an educational context, is offered by the schoolbook *BM Add. MS 37 516*.⁴² This wooden tablet, edited by F. G. Kenyon⁴³ and dated to the 3rd – 4th century AD,⁴⁴ contains on one side a complete declension through all cases and numbers – the dual included – of a *chria* about Pythagoras. We present here by way of illustration only a few lines of the transcription:⁴⁵

⁴¹ I. e. a statement made voluntarily by the speaker, not arising from a specific circumstance. The Isocrates-*chria* quoted above (p. 252) belongs to this type.

⁴² = Criatore (n. 39 [1996]) no. 364. Cf. also no. 3868 in the *Leuven Database of Ancient Books* (LDAB) of W. Clarysse and no. 370 in the *Catalogue of Paraliterary Papyri* (CPP) of M. Huys. For two other schoolbooks which illustrate the κλίσις χρείας, cf. infra III. 3.

⁴³ F. G. Kenyon, “Two Greek School-Tablets”, *JHS* 29 (1909) 29–30.

⁴⁴ Kenyon dates the hand of the schoolbook to the 3rd century AD, but according to G. Bastianini and M. Manfredi, as Sedley remarks (n. 33 [1998a] 167 n. 1 and [1998b] 122 n. 1), it is at least a century younger.

⁴⁵ For a complete transcription, see now Hock, O’Neil (n. 22) 62–66 and Wouters (n. 2). For the meaning of the *chria*, cf. the studies of Sedley mentioned in note 33. This

Singular:

- 1 ὁ Πυθαγόρας φιλόσοφος ἀποβάς καὶ γράμματα διδάσκων συν-
εβούλευν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μαθηταῖς ἐναιμόνων ἀπέχεσθαι
2 τοῦ Πυθαγόρου φιλοσόφου ἀποβάντες καὶ γράμματα διδάσκ-
οντος λόγος ἀπομνημονεύεται συμβουλευόντος τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μαθη-
ταῖς ἐναιμόνων ἀπ[έ]χεσθ[αι]
...

Plural:

- 12 καὶ πληθυντικῶς
...
15 τοῖς Πυθαγόραις φιλοσόφοις ἀποβάσι καὶ γράμματα διδασκ-
όντοις ἔδοξεν συμβουλεύσαι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ⁴⁶ μαθηταῖς ἐναιμόνων
ἀπέχεσθαι
16 τοὺς Πυθαγόρας φιλοσόφους ἀπο[βάν]τας καὶ γράμματα
διδάσκοντάς φασιν συμβουλεύσαι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μαθηταῖς ἐναιμόνων
ἀπέχεσθαι
...
1.2 ἀποβάντες: *l.* ἀποβάντος
συμβουλευόντος: *l.* συμβουλεύοντος
1.15 ἀποβάσι: *corr. ex* ἀποβάντοις
1.15 διδασκόντοις: *l.* διδάσκουσι
1.15 and 16 συμβουλεύσαι: *l.* συμβουλεύσαι

1 Pythagoras the philosopher, when he had abandoned (philosophy) and was teaching grammar, used to advise his pupils to abstain from (the word) ἐναίμονες.

2 The saying is remembered of the philosopher Pythagoras, when he had abandoned (philosophy) and was teaching grammar, as advising his own pupils to abstain from (the word) ἐναίμονες.

...

12 And in the plural:

...

15 It seemed good to the Pythagoras philosophers, when they ...

16 They say that the Pythagoras philosophers, when they ...

...

author very convincingly unmasked the *chria* as a grammarian's joke: the comic anecdote is that the philosopher Pythagoras at a certain moment changed his profession and as a grammarian taught his students to avoid the term ἐναίμονες for "blooded creatures" and to use ἐνάιοι instead. Our translation is based on his interpretation.

⁴⁶ In the dual and plural each time the singular form ἑαυτοῦ is used incorrectly.

For a corresponding example in the Latin tradition, we can refer to Diomedes (GL I, 310. 1–29).⁴⁷ This grammarian (4th cent. AD) inflects, besides mentioning several types of *chriae*, the following *chria* in the two numbers – the dual, of course, does not exist in Latin – and in the different cases, the ablative included (compare with the Isocrates-χρεία above):

Marcus Porcius Cato dixit litterarum radices amaras esse, fructus iocundiores.

Marcus Porcius Cato said that the roots of education are bitter, but its fruits sweet.

He also presents the declension of an action-*chria* about Diogenes, but this time only in the singular:

Diogenes Cynicus philosophus in die accensa lucerna quaerebat hominem.

Diogenes the Cynic philosopher used to seek a man by day with a lighted lamp.⁴⁸

4. the κλίσις χρείας: grammatical or rhetorical exercise?

The κλίσις χρείας, though described in detail by Theon, is not mentioned in the rhetorical manuals of (ps.-)Hermogenes and Aphthonius. Together with the fact that the school tablet mentioned above comes from the class of a grammarian,⁴⁹ this seems to indicate that soon after Theon (1st cent. AD) in Greek education the *chria*-declension, by nature a grammatical exercise, became part of the curriculum of the *grammaticus*.⁵⁰

Nicolaus, to be sure, discusses the κλίσις χρείας-exercise again a few centuries later, but, as Hock and O’Neil remark,⁵¹ some comments in his

⁴⁷ Cf. also Hock, O’Neil (n. 22) 67–73.

⁴⁸ Hock, O’Neil’s translation, *ibid.*

⁴⁹ The other side of the schoolbook, written in the same hand, contains a partial inflection paradigm (optative and participles) of the verb νικάω in all tenses. Morphological exercises like this clearly belonged to the domain of the *grammaticus*. For other school texts containing conjugations or declensions, cf. the catalogue of Criore (n. 39 [1996], *ad* ‘grammatical exercises’). For a discussion of (a few of) these exercises, cf.: A. Wouters, “La grammaire grecque dans l’école antique, d’après les papyrus”, in: L. Basset – F. Biville (eds.), *Actes du XXXI^e Congrès International de l’A. P. L. A. E. S. (Universités Lumière-Lyon 2 et Jean Moulin-Lyon 3. Lyon 5, 6 et 7 juin 1998)* (Lyon 1999) 58–61; Morgan (n. 39) 152–189 (ch. 5: *Grammar and the power of language*), and Criore (n. 39 [2001]) 214–215.

⁵⁰ Cf.: A. Brinkmann, “Aus dem antiken Schulunterricht”, *RhM* 65 (1910) 153–155; Wouters (n. 2).

⁵¹ Hock, O’Neil (n. 22) 54.

Progymnasmata point to the same evolution. After mentioning one group of authors who, in the series of *progymnasmata*, accorded to the *χρεία* the first rather than the third place (like [ps.-]Hermogenes, Aphthonius and himself), he continues (18. 1–6 F):

Ἴτεροι δὲ τάξαντες αὐτὴν πρώτην οὐ τὴν νῦν ταύτην αὐτῇ διαίρεσιν ἀποδεδώκασιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν κατὰ πάσας τὰς πτώσεις καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς προφορὰν μόνην ἐνόμισαν τοῖς νέοις <ἄρτι> τῶν ποιητῶν ἀφισταμένοις καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἰοῦσιν ἀρκεῖν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου μελέτην καὶ ἐχρῶντο αὐτῇ οὕτως ...

Those others (i. e. former progymnastic authors whose manuals have not been handed down to us⁵²) who made it the first exercise have not accorded it the same divisions as is done now (i. e. the *ἐργασία*-exercise, subdivided into several steps, for which see *infra* II. 5), but thought recitation (of a *chreia*) in all cases and numbers alone was enough for young men who were just proceeding from the study of the poets and coming to the study of rhetoric to practice declamation of political speech, and they used it in this way ...

Then, *exempli gratia*, a *χρεία*, attributed to the famous Pittacus of Mitylene, is declined in the singular. Nicolaus thus introduces the *κλίσις χρείας* while referring to a situation in the past and contrasting it with the contemporary division, from which it has been excluded (cf. *infra* II. 5). His discussion therefore does not refute the transition of the declension exercise to the grammar school, which we assume.

In the Latin tradition, a similar evolution, confirmed by the testimony of the grammarian Diomedes, took place, probably a little earlier. Consistent with Quintilian's attribution of the *declinatio chriae* to the domain of the *grammaticus*, Suetonius at the beginning of the 2nd century AD seems to suggest that already before his time exercises like the declension of a *chria* had passed gradually to the secondary school (*De gramm. et rhet.* 25. 4):

Nam et dicta praeclare per omnes figuras <versare>⁵³ ... consuerant ... donec sensim haec exoluerunt ...

⁵² Cf.: L. L. Grabbe, R. F. Hock, "The Chreia Discussion of Nicolaus of Myra. Introduction, Translation and Comments", in: Hock, O'Neil (n. 4) 240–241.

⁵³ R. A. Kaster (*Studies on the Text of Suetonius De Grammaticis et Rhetoribus*, American Classical Studies 28 [Atlanta 1992] 111; C. Suetonius Tranquillus *De Grammaticis et Rhetoribus*. Ed. with a transl., introd., and comm. by R. A. Kaster [Oxford 1995] 30–31 and 280–281), following Colson (n. 6 [1924] 120, *ad* 'declinatio... ca-

praeclare: *l. praeclara*, as accepted by Colson.⁵⁴

They (i. e. teachers of rhetoric) would vary the grammatical constructions of notable sayings in all possible ways ... In the long these practices (i. e. the κλίσις χρείας together with all the other exercises listed before by Suetonius) gradually passed out of use (i. e. in the school of the rhetor)...⁵⁵

5. elaboration of a χρεία

A second difference between Theon and the later progymnastic authors – Nicolaus this time included – concerns the χρεία-exercises as a whole. While the former treats eight separate exercises (cf. supra II. 3), the latter present only one exercise, consisting of the elaboration (ἐργασία) of a *chria* according to a fixed pattern of several steps (κεφάλαια). Aphthonius for example distinguishes the following headings for working out a *chria* (23.14–17 Sp):

- (1) praising the persona of the *chria*
- (2) paraphrasing the *chria*-sentence

sus'), in our opinion rightly assumes that Suetonius is alluding here to the κλίσις χρείας. Vacher too in her edition (Suétone. *Grammairiens et rhéteurs*, texte établi et trad. par M.-C. Vacher [Paris 1993]) connects this passage with the *chria*-declension. Unlike Kaster she bases herself on the reading of the archetype (*dicta praeclare per omnes figuras, per casus ... exponere*), which includes also the words *per casus*. Consequently she interprets the text somewhat differently: while Kaster gives *figura* the meaning of 'posture' or 'grammatical construction', Vacher attributes to it the meaning of 'rhetorical figure', linking only the words *per casus* ("through the different cases") to the κλίσις χρείας and considering the transposition of a *chria* into the different rhetorical figures as a variant of this exercise ("Une variante de cet exercice consistait à faire passer chries et sentences non plus par tous les cas (*per casus*), mais par toutes les figures rhétoriques (*per omnes figuras*)" [*ibid.*, 209 n. 18]). In our opinion this interpretation of *per omnes figuras* does not make much sense: which preliminary exercise could Suetonius have in mind here? In addition, as Kaster observes ([1992] 111–114 and [1995] 280), the text of the archetype is probably corrupt because of its irregular syntactical construction. The words *per casus* must very probably be considered a gloss on *per omnes figuras*: "to cause a *dictum* to pass through all the cases is to display it in its various grammatical constructions, or 'postures'" (*ibid.* [1992] 113). As does Varro in his *De ling. Lat.* 9. 52, Suetonius uses the term *figura* with the meaning of "morphological variation of a noun" or "case-form" (as opposed to *casus* = "case-use") (cf.: D. J. Taylor, *Declinatio. A Study of the Linguistic Theory of Marcus Terentius Varro*, Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science. III: Studies in the History of Linguistics 2 [Amsterdam 1974] 87).

⁵⁴ Colson (n. 6 [1924]) 120, *ad* 'declinatio...casus'.

⁵⁵ Kaster's translation (n. 53 [1995]). In our view Kaster (*ibid.*, 279–280) rightly argues that the words *donec ... exoluerunt* do not mean that the *chria*-declension and all

- (3) formulating the rationale or justification (αἰτία) of the *chria*
- (4) arguing the *chria* from the opposite
- (5) inserting a comparison or analogy from a different sphere
- (6) illustrating the *chria* with an example
- (7) adding a testimony of an ancient author
- (8) writing down a brief epilogue

As this division makes clear, the ἐργασία of a χρεία took the form of a brief composition or essay, intended to teach pupils to introduce, narrate, argue and conclude a particular subject, in preparation of their further rhetorical studies.⁵⁶

III. THE MEANING OF *RATIO*?

Now that we have a clear idea of the nature of the *chria*-exercise, let us return to the puzzling meaning of the word *ratio* in *Inst. Or.* 1. 9. 5.

1. earlier views

First of all we will have a look at the different interpretations which modern scholars have proposed. In general we can divide their suggestions into two groups.

i. *ratio* = a general term

The first group considers *ratio* to be a general term, not a specific grammatical metaterm. Robinson⁵⁷ for example takes it to have a broad meaning comparable to that of *ratio* in 1. 9. 3: *quorum omnium similis est ratio*,

the other exercises involved had ceased to exist, but rather that they had left the domain of the rhetor to become part of the grammarian's lessons.

⁵⁶ Cf.: Hock, O'Neil (n. 22) 89. For a presentation of the different ἐργασία χρείας-exercises that literary sources have handed down to us, cf.: *ibid.*, 98–359. As far as we know, no (school) papyri containing the elaboration of a χρεία have been preserved. The only χρεία-papyrus which is known to us besides the elementary reading and writing exercises mentioned in note 39, and the three grammatical school papyri presented in this paper (cf. supra II. 3 and infra III. 3), is *PSI I. 85* (ed. pr.: T. Lodi, "Appunti di retorica", in: *Papiri greci e latini I* [Firenze 1912] 157–158; cf. also Hock, O'Neil [n. 22] 94–97 and G. Bastianini, "PSI 85 e la definizione di 'chreia'", in: M. S. Funghi [ed.], *Aspetti di letteratura gnomica nel mondo antico II* [Firenze 2004] 249–263). This papyrus, dated to the 3rd century AD, contains a short series of questions and answers about the definition and the etymology of the χρεία. It is not certain that it derives from a school context. In any case, Cribiore (n. 39 [1996]) and Morgan ([n. 39] 286–287) do not include *PSI I. 85* in their list of (rhetorical) school texts.

⁵⁷ Robinson (n. 6) 378, n. 1.

forma diversa – “all (sc. the exercises *sententia*, *chria* and *ethologia/aetiology*, cf. supra p. 249) have the same purpose, but differ in form” (our emphasis).⁵⁸ Although rather vague, the translations by (1) Cousin,⁵⁹ (2) Butler (cf. already supra p. 250) and (3) Ortega Carmona (cf. already supra p. 250) seem to go along the same lines:

(1) Pour tous ces exemples, on fait passer la déclinaison par les mêmes cas, et l'on traite de faits autant que de paroles (our emphasis).

(2) All these instances are couched in the same grammatical form and deeds no less than sayings may be presented for treatment (our emphasis).

(3) En todas estas clases de crías la digresión tiene lugar en las mismas formas de declamación y existe fundamento tanto para los hechos como para los dichos (our emphasis).

ii. *ratio* = a technical term

According to the second group of scholars, *ratio* has a technical meaning.

a. *ratio* = αἰτία

After Spalding's note,⁶⁰ Colson⁶¹ was the first to propose a technical meaning of the word here: he regards *ratio* as the Latin equivalent of the Greek technical term αἰτία, which indicates a *chria*-exercise consisting in giving the ‘reason’ of the *chria* involved (cf. supra II. 5):⁶² “and the words ‘et tam ... ratio est’ mean that the ‘practical’ *Chria* is just as susceptible of the αἰτία treatment as the ‘logical’”.⁶³

⁵⁸ *Ratio* in this sentence is mostly assigned a broad meaning (cf., e. g.: Colson [n. 6 (1924)] 119, *ad* ‘ratio’; Russell [n. 1] 211). Henderson ([n. 6] 88), however, does not exclude the possibility that it has a technical meaning, referring to the ἐργασία of a *chria* (cf. infra ii. b).

⁵⁹ Quintilien. *Institution Oratoire*, texte établi et trad. par J. Cousin (Paris 1975).

⁶⁰ Spalding (n. 7) 209, *ad* ‘ratio est’.

⁶¹ Colson (n. 6 [1921]) 153; cf. also (n. 6 [1924]) 121, *ad* ‘et ... ratio est’.

⁶² (Ps.-)Hermogenes (7. 18–20 R) for example gives the following αἰτία for the Isocrates-χρεία quoted above: τὰ γὰρ μέγιστα τῶν πραγμάτων ἐκ πόνων φιλεῖ κατορθοῦσθαι, κατορθωθέντα δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν φέρει (“for the greatest things are wont to succeed through toil, and when successful bring pleasure”).

⁶³ Colson (n. 6 [1921]) 153. See also the translations of:

(1) Rahn (n. 19): “bei allen diesen Arten findet die Abwandlung (= ‘inflection’?) in denselben Deklamationsformen statt, und es wird ebenso für Handlungen wie für Aussprüche eine Begründung gegeben” (our emphasis),

(2) Bornecque (Quintilien. *Institution Oratoire*, texte revu et trad. avec introd. et notes par H. Bornecque [Paris 1954]): “dans tous ces exemples, on emploie les mêmes

b. *ratio* = ἐργασία

Secondly, as Henderson⁶⁴ suggests, Quintilian may use (the word) *ratio* to refer to a system involving a whole series of *chria*-exercises, one of which is the αἰτία. In this case *ratio* is to be equated with the Greek term ἐργασία, referring to the elaboration of a *chria*-exercise according to several headings or steps (cf. supra II. 5).⁶⁵

c. *ratio* = *ratio declinationis*

Thirdly, instead of referring, as in the previous two technical interpretations, to another *chria*-exercise, *ratio* can reveal an aspect of the κλίσις χρείας itself. In this context the translation by Russell (cf. already supra p. 250) must probably be placed, since he seems to interpret *ratio* as *ratio [declinationis] per eosdem casus* ('declension principle⁶⁶ through the same cases'), i. e. as the system underlying the first part of the sentence:

cas imposés de la déclinaison et l'on y donne l'explication aussi bien d'actions que de mots" (our emphasis), and

(3) Lana (I. Lana, *Quintiliano, il "sublime" e gli "esercizi preparatori" di Elio Teone. Ricerca sulle fonti greche di Quintiliano e sull'autore "del sublime"* [Torino 1951] 130): "le chrie si possono declinare secondo i vari casi e devono contenere la spiegazione sia di detti sia di fatti" (description, no translation; our emphasis).

They all assign to *ratio* the meaning of 'explanation' or 'reason' and thus seem to share Colson's opinion, but we cannot exclude that their translations have a broader meaning than the technical αἰτία has, and that we should therefore put them in the first category.

⁶⁴ Henderson ([n. 6] 88) lists several possible interpretations of the term *ratio*, including that of Colson above and that of O'Neil below. Although he does not explicitly adopt a particular interpretation, he seems to have a preference for the two technical meanings which we have elucidated so far.

⁶⁵ The foundations of the ἐργασία must have been worked out quite early by Greek rhetoricians, as in Latin a similar standard exercise, consisting of 7 steps and by way of illustration applied to the elaboration of a *sententia*, already appears in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (4. 43. 56–44. 58), a rhetorical manual dating from the 1st century BC, based on earlier Greek sources (cf. Bonner [n. 6] 259; Mack, O'Neil [n. 27] 162; for more information concerning the historical development of the ἐργασία, cf. Hock, O'Neil [n. 22] 84–90). Consequently it is quite likely that Quintilian was familiar with this elaboration-exercise.

⁶⁶ For *ratio* referring to the system of declension or conjugation, cf., e. g.: Varro, *De ling. Lat.* 8. 6: *Qua enim ratione in uno vocabulo declinare didiceris, in infinito numero nominum uti possis* ("for that system by which you learned to decline one word, you can use for a countless number of nouns" [Taylor's translation, (n. 53) 35; cf. also 62, note to p. 35 and 119, ad 'ratio']).

All these can be declined through the same range of cases, and the principle applies to *Chriae* based on actions as well as those based on words⁶⁷ (our emphasis).

d. *ratio* = system of introductory formulas

But there is still another possibility, which seems more likely to us. As Theon illustrates in his progymnastic manual (cf. supra II. 3), the κλίσις χρείας-exercise is not only supported by the inflectional principle, but also requires the systematic application of various phrases in order to inflect the name of the person to whom the saying or action is attributed through the five – six in Latin – different cases. Thus, *ratio* could also refer to the system or method of using specific introductory formulas in order to inflect a given *chria*.

This interpretation, as we have seen above (p. 251), has been suggested by O’Neil in 1986:⁶⁸ “the key word (i. e. of the passage involved) is, of course, *ratio* which refers to the method by which someone can introduce a *chreia* so that each oblique case follows logically and syntactically”. Although we think it to be the correct one, O’Neil’s interpretation of the passage *et tam factorum quam dictorum ratio est* as a whole, however, is less felicitous. Therefore, before offering our arguments in favour of his interpretation of *ratio*, which until now has not received the attention it deserves,⁶⁹ we must briefly discuss his interpretation of the passage.

2. O’Neil’s interpretation

After observing that Theon lists several introductory formulas of which some are for sayings-*chriae*, some for action-*chriae* (cf. supra II. 3), O’Neil suddenly remarks (p. 135): “Quintilian, whether or not he was familiar with such complicated exercises (i. e. the use of different introductory phrases for different types of *chriae*), here advocates a simple approach: treat every *chreia* alike and merely decline it without introducing complication”. Con-

⁶⁷ Viljamaa ([n. 3] 192), although it is not clear which meaning he exactly assigns to *ratio*, apparently also takes the second part of the sentence as still belonging to the information on the *declinatio chriae* given by Quintilian.

⁶⁸ O’Neil (n. 4) 135.

⁶⁹ As far as we know, O’Neil’s suggestion is only referred to by Henderson in 1991 (cf. supra n. 64). As we have seen, it has not been adopted in the recent Quintilian-editions of Ortega Carmona (n. 17) and Russell (n. 1). Another reason why we considered it useful to take up O’Neil’s interpretation again, is the fact that, unlike O’Neil himself, we substantiate his reading with the literary as well as papyrological sources about the κλίσις χρείας available now.

forming to this view, he offers the following translation, already quoted above:

In all these (sc. *chriae*), too, declension is done in the same cases, and the method (i. e. of inserting introductory formulas) is the same for both action-chreiai and sayings-chreiai (our emphasis).

Further on, in his rendition of Quintilian 1. 9 in its entirety, he translates the sentence as follows (p. 149):

In all these types (i. e. of *chriae*), too, declension is done for both action-chriae and sayings-chriae.

This translation, as one can see, is only a brief rendering of the corresponding Latin words. It does not even include the specific meaning of *ratio*. Together with the remark and first translation quoted above, this fact makes it clear that in O’Neil’s opinion Quintilian, unlike Theon, makes no distinction between the introductory phrases for λογικαί *chriae* and for πρακτικαί *chriae*.

The reason why O’Neil here assigns to Quintilian a simple approach, remains unclear, although he seems to be guided by his interpretation of the first part of the sentence, where according to him things are simplified in a similar way.⁷⁰ However, in our opinion there is no particular reason to interpret Quintilian’s comment in this way. Since it is generally assumed that Theon, who, as O’Neil himself remarks, distinguishes λογικαί *formulae* from πρακτικαί *formulae*,⁷¹ lived in the 1st century AD, it is quite probable

⁷⁰ O’Neil states (p. 135) that Quintilian, since for each type of *chria* the declension through the different cases is the same, “is saying simply that the sense of the chreia in these manipulations makes no difference; form is the primary concern”. We agree that the words *per eosdem ducitur casus* indeed seem to indicate that some cases are not more appropriate for sayings-*chriae* than for action-*chriae* and *vice versa*. Cf. also Spalding (n. 7) 208, *ad* ‘declinatio – ducitur’: “*per eosdem sic intellige, ut non activae chriae ullus magis proprius casus dicatur esse, quam ceterarum*”. On the other hand we think that O’Neil goes too far in his interpretation when he assumes that for Quintilian the meaning of the declined *chriae* is not important at all.

⁷¹ The distinction between the two types of *formulae* is also represented in the examples of *declinatio chriarum* – one of a verbal *chria* and one of a gestural *chria* – which Diomedes offers us in the later Latin grammatical tradition (GL I, 310. 1–29; cf. supra II. 3): the verbal *chria* contains the *formulae* ‘*dictum fertur*’ (‘the statement is reported’) and ‘*dictum accepimus*’ (‘we have received the statement’) in the genitive and ablative respectively, while in the gestural *chria* the *formulae* ‘*memoria fertur*’ (‘the memory is reported’) and ‘*memoriae traditum est*’ (‘to memory has been handed down’) appear in both cases respectively. Compare with Theon’s list of introductory

that Quintilian (ca 30–ca 100 AD), whose *Institutio Oratoria* shows a great familiarity with education in the Greek world, knew these formulaic differences.⁷² But would he in this case have simplified things? In some other passages on the early training of boys, he seems to advocate what O’Neil calls a “sink or swim philosophy”.⁷³ Why should we, then, make things more difficult by assuming that Quintilian abolishes the border between verbal and gestural introductory phrases in order to simplify for the pupils of the grammar school the κλίσις χρείας-exercise? In particular making a distinction between the two types of *formulae* may have formed an additional didactic tool for teaching varieties in syntactical constructions.⁷⁴

3. our interpretation

Taking all this into account, we propose the following translation:

In all these (types of *chriae*) inflection is done in the same cases, and there is a (specific formula-)system for the (*chriae* based on) actions, as well as one for the (*chriae* based on) words.

Now that we have corrected O’Neil’s interpretation of the words *tam factorum quam dictorum ratio est*, how can the meaning, that we propose for *ratio*, be defended? Although the earlier suggestions mentioned above are not a priori implausible, certain elements favour our interpretation.

phrases above. This author distinguishes λογικάί from πρακτικάί formulas in the genitive and dative.

⁷² According to Lana ([n. 63] 150) Quintilian utilized Theon for the composition of his *Institutio Oratoria*, a conclusion based on a comparative study of both of their works (pp. 113–150).

⁷³ O’Neil (n. 4) 120–122: this philosophy, also discernible in for example 1. 1. 30, implies confronting pupils from the beginning with more difficult exercises instead of postponing them, i. e. “throwing the young student into deep water and forcing him to swim” (p. 120).

⁷⁴ Cf. Colson (n. 6 [1924] 120), according to whom the *chria*-declension with its varying introductory *formulae* through the different cases had possibly some value in teaching these syntactic variations, besides solely drilling in the inflections. Cf. also Bonner ([n. 6] 257) and Kaster (n. 53 [1995] 279), who consider the (declension of a) *chria* to be an exercise aiming at developing variety of expression. Cf. Patillon ([n. 1] p. LVI), who regards the χρεία as a preparatory exercise for the instruction of the ‘modes de l’énoncé’ or speech acts, including, e. g., the assertive and optative modes. Theon, indeed, distinguishes various manners of expressing a *chria* (99. 14–19 P), e. g., as a gnomic saying (assertive mode, including a straightforward statement) or as a wish (optative mode).

First of all we can put forward a stylistic argument. After having spent about ten lines on the enumeration of different types of *chriai*, Quintilian speaks almost in one breath, in hardly two lines, about the possibility to inflect all these types through the different cases and about the existence of a *ratio* for verbal as well as gestural *chriai*. Since he moreover connects the two comments with repeated *et*, is it then not at least plausible that he is alluding here twice to the same exercise, i. e. the declension of a *chria*?

A second argument is suggested by archeological findings. Besides a κλίσις χρείας-exercise about Pythagoras (cf. supra II. 3), the desert of Egypt has handed down to us two grammatical school texts of the 3rd century AD⁷⁵ each containing a list of *formulae* for the inflection of a sayings-*chria*.⁷⁶ We transcribe here for illustration one of these two lists (viz. tablet 5b of *BM Add. MS 37 533*), of which the vocative of the dual and the complete plural have disappeared:

320 ὀρθή εἶπεν
 321 γενική λόγος ἀπομνημονεύεται εἰπόντος
 322 δοτική ἔδοξεν εἰπεῖν
 323 αἰτιατική φασὶν εἰπεῖν
 324 κλητική σύ ποτε εἶπας
 325 καὶ δυικῶς
 326 ὀρθή εἰπάτην
 327 γενική λόγος ἀπομνημονεύεται εἰπόντων
 328 δοτική ἔδοξεν εἰπεῖν
 329 αἰτιατική φασὶν εἰπεῖν

320 Nominative: He said
 321 Genitive: The saying is recalled of the one saying
 322 Dative: It seemed best (to him) to say
 323 Accusative: They say that (he) said
 324 Vocative: You once said
 325 And in the dual
 326 Nominative: The two said
 327 Genitive: The saying is recalled of the two saying

⁷⁵ The exercises are part of two schoolbooks composed of several wooden tablets, viz. *BM Add. MS 37 533* (ed. pr.: Kenyon [n. 43] 32–39 = Crihiore [n. 39 (1996)] no. 385; cf. also LDAB no. 5315 and CPP no. 278 [cf. supra n. 42]) and *Bodl. Gr. Inscr.* 3019 (ed. pr.: P. J. Parsons, “A School-Book from the Sayce Collection”, *ZPE* 6 [1970] 133–149 = Crihiore [n. 39 (1996)] no. 388; cf. also LDAB no. 2418 and CPP no. 255 [cf. supra n. 42]). Given the nature of the materials they contain and the handwritings they represent (together with other characteristics typical of schoolpapyri; cf. Crihiore [n. 39 (1996)]), these notebooks were used in the class of the grammar teacher.

⁷⁶ For more detailed information, cf. Hock, O’Neil (n. 22) 56–61; Wouters (n. 2).

328 Dative: It seemed best (to the two) to say

329 Accusative: They say that (the two) said⁷⁷

Both direct sources, giving a concrete insight into the daily practice of ancient education, show that familiarizing pupils with the introductory phrases of a *chria* was part of the curriculum of the *grammaticus*.⁷⁸ In all probability there existed even a standard method to teach systematically the rules for the κλίσις χρείας in the class of the grammarian, since the *formulae* in the two exercises, forming a selection from those listed by Theon, are identical and coincide with those used in the declension of the *chria* about Pythagoras.⁷⁹ In any case, there is a good chance that Quintilian had similar school exercises in mind when he wrote *in his omnibus ... ratio est*, its first part alluding to exercises like the Pythagoras-χρεία, and its last part to lists of *formulae* comparable to the two models which have been preserved.

4. further discussion of the earlier views

What about the existing interpretations?

i. In our opinion there is little chance that *ratio* has the general, non-technical meaning of ‘purport’ or ‘treatment’. In this case the sense of the word group concerned would not only be vague in contrast with the rest of Quintilian’s discussion of the *chria*-exercise, but also somewhat redundant, since Quintilian clarifies already in his enumeration of different types of *chriae* that there are verbal as well as gestural *chriae* (cf. supra n. 29).

ii. a More can be said in favour of Colson’s rendering. His suggestion to equate *ratio* to the Greek technical term αἰτία is largely based on his interpretation of the words *subiectis dictorum rationibus* in the sentence (1.9.3):

⁷⁷ Hock, O’Neil (n. 22).

⁷⁸ The school texts involved, it is true, contain only Greek grammar. However, since generally speaking (literate) education was organized in a similar way in Greek and Roman culture throughout antiquity (cf., e. g.: H.-I. Marrou, *Histoire de l’éducation dans l’antiquité* [Paris 1965] 356–373; Morgan [n. 39] 44–47), we can use them for expanding our knowledge of Roman grammatical instruction too. In fact, Quintilian himself at the beginning of his discussion on grammatical education remarks that the method of teaching Latin and Greek is the same (1.4.1): *Nec refert de Graeco an de Latino loquar, quamquam Graecum esse priorem placet: utrique eadem via est* (“what I say applies indifferently to the Greek teacher and to the Latin, though I prefer the Greek to come first. Both use the same methods”).

⁷⁹ Except for the fact that the verbal forms of λέγειν have been replaced by the corresponding verbal forms of συμβουλεύειν.

Sententiae quoque et chriae et aetiologiae (?) subiectis dictorum rationibus apud grammaticos scribantur ...

Maxims, etc. (i. e. *chriae* and ‘aetiologies’ [cf. supra p. 249]), are suitable exercises for the middle school, including a statement of the reasons (αἰτίαι) for them.⁸⁰

According to this author, writing out a preliminary exercise of one of the three types mentioned – the *chria* included – also comprises for students giving its reason or foundation.⁸¹ We can ask ourselves, however, if pupils attending the lessons of the *grammaticus* were already able or expected to add these αἰτίαι themselves to the exercises. Russell, who does not agree with Colson on this point, translates the *ablativus absolutus* as “so long as the arguments are supplied”, and states in an explanatory note that “at this stage, the pupils will not be able to develop the arguments for themselves”.⁸² If we follow this reasoning, it may seem slightly peculiar that Quintilian, after mentioning a grammatical exercise (sc. the *declinatio chriae*) which the students have to do themselves, refers to a task (sc. expressing the reason of a verbal or gestural *chria*) which has in fact already been done by the teacher. But even if we assume with Colson that *a discipulis* is the implied agent of *rationibus subiectis*, it is in our opinion still difficult to explain why Quintilian refers twice, at the beginning and at the end of the passage involved, to the αἰτίαι-exercise. The second time indeed *factorum* is added to *ratio*, but would Quintilian have inserted this repetition just because of the existence of both sayings-*chriae* and action-*chriae*?⁸³ Would he not

⁸⁰ Colson’s translation, (n. 6 [1921]) 151.

⁸¹ Cf. Colson (n. 6 [1921]) 151–152; id. (n. 6 [1924]) 119, *ad* ‘subiectis dictorum rationibus’ and 121, *ad* ‘et ... ratio est’.

⁸² Russell (n. 1) 211. Cf. also, concerning the *aetiologia*-exercise (cf. supra p. 249), Bonner (n. 6) 258: “Probably, then, this was an easy saying-exercise ...; for here the author himself supplied the ‘explanation’, which, in subsequent treatments, the boy might have to find for himself”, and especially the additional note (n. 64): “Colson’s contention that the *pupil* always supplied the reason is dubious”.

⁸³ Compare with Robinson (n. 6) 378: “Doubtless Quintilian would have been more accurate had he said *subiectis dictorum factorumque rationibus*, just as in l. 13 he says *et tam factorum quam dictorum ratio est*” (our emphasis). This author, however, unlike Colson, interprets *ratio* twice in a different way (378 n. 1): while equating, like Colson, *rationibus* with *causis* (αἰτίαι), he attributes to the second *ratio*, as we have already seen above, a broader meaning (‘purport’). Moreover, in his opinion the words *subiectis dictorum rationibus* refer to *aetiologiae* alone. If this interpretation, adopted by O’Neil [(n. 4) 125; contra: Viljamaa [n. 3] 195), is correct, there is probably even less chance that there is a connection between the two *ratio*’s, as Colson supposes.

have considered this observation – viz. as there are gestural *chriae*, there are also *rationes factorum* – too logical to be stated explicitly to his reader, who is elsewhere supposed to be familiar with the only briefly described preliminary exercises?

ii. b As for Henderson’s suggestion to regard *ratio* as the Latin counterpart of the Greek ἐργασία, we can, though now more emphatically, pose the initial question from the discussion above: were pupils of the grammarian’s class already supposed to elaborate a *chria* according to its different κεφάλαια (cf. supra II. 5)? In our opinion this more complex exercise belonged rather to the domain of the rhetor.⁸⁴ Furthermore, even if Quintilian had assigned it a place in chapter 1. 9, it would not be quite clear why he should compress such an extensive exercise into one single polysemic word.⁸⁵

ii. c Finally, to the remaining interpretation of Russell, who apparently regards *ratio* as *ratio declinationis*, we can object that the words *et tam factorum quam dictorum ratio est* would in this case be superfluous: since Quintilian, as we have seen above (in notes 29 and 34), already distinguishes, in his enumeration of different *chriae*-types, λογικαί from πρακτικαί χρεῖαι and since he makes it clear with the words *in his omnibus ... casus*, which immediately follow this list, that all these *chriae*, whether describing a saying or an action, are declined without any difference through the same cases (*per eosdem casus*, cf. supra n. 70), what then is the use of mentioning once again that the declension principle applies to *dicta* as well as to *facta*?

Henderson⁸⁶ uses this last argument of redundancy with respect to O’Neil’s – and hence also our – interpretation of *ratio*. Although he confines himself at first sight in his article to the rendering of about three possible suggestions to elucidate the word concerned, he seems to prefer either Colson’s interpretation or his own (cf. already supra n. 64) when he assumes that O’Neil’s suggestion makes the word group *et tam ... ratio est* largely

⁸⁴ We agree with Colson on this point ([n. 6 (1921)] 152): “*Apud rhetora*, the elaborate treatment of Aphthonius may be used. *Apud grammaticum*, the *ratio* (in casu giving the αἰτία [cf. supra ii. a]) is as much as the pupils can manage”.

⁸⁵ Quintilian possibly would have used in this case the term *operatio*, like Priscian (5th – 6th cent. AD) in his Latin translation of (ps.-)Hermogenes’ progymnastic manual (GL III, 432. 10), or the term *tractatio* or *expolitio*, adopted by the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* within the framework of an elaboration-exercise consisting of 7 headings (4. 43. 56 – 44. 58; cf. supra n. 65; Mack, O’Neil [n. 27] 161; Lausberg [n. 9] 418 – 419, § 842; Hock, O’Neil [n. 22] 86 – 88).

⁸⁶ Henderson (n. 6) 88.

redundant.⁸⁷ In the light of what we have said about the *declinatio chriae*, however, it is clear that there is no reason to agree with Henderson on this point. Both Theon's discussion of the κλίσις χρείας and the school exercises mentioned above confirm that knowledge of the different *formulae* is essential for inflecting *chriae* (correctly) through the five or six cases. It is only logical, then, that Quintilian, after uttering the possibility to transpose a *chria* into the different cases, refers explicitly for pedagogical concerns to the introductory phrases, which are needed to bring the inflection exercise to a favourable conclusion. Furthermore Henderson (p. 88) adds to O'Neil's interpretation the comment that it "conforms Quintilian's view to that rejected by Nicolaus" (18. 1–6 F; cf. *supra*), i. e. that *chriae* should only be inflected, without combining this grammatical exercise with other more rhetorical ones such as writing out the αἰτία. In other words, he links the meaning of *ratio* to the question of whether or not *declinatio* is the only exercise prescribed by Quintilian for the *chria*. In our opinion this remark is not totally correct either. When *ratio* is understood the way we do, Quintilian, it is true, possibly⁸⁸ considers κλίσις the only exercise to be dealt with by the grammarian, but in the second book of his *Institutio Oratoria*, as Henderson himself notices (p. 98), he mentions the term *chria* once again, this time in the context of rhetorical education (2. 4. 26). In this passage Quintilian speaks about what he himself in his boyhood experienced as a useful and amusing exercise, which consisted in inquiring into questions like "Why is Venus portrayed as armed at Sparta?" and "Why was Cupid believed to be a winged boy armed with arrows and torch?". Subsequently he concludes:

quod genus *chriae* videri potest.⁸⁹

This exercise may seem to be a kind of *chria* (our translation).

⁸⁷ Cf. also *ibid.*, 88: "It is just possible that Quintilian held this last view, that *chria* (sic) receive only grammatical variation. More likely, he agreed with Theon's view that *declinatio* should be combined with more properly pro-gymnastic, pre-rhetorical elaborations".

⁸⁸ If the agent of *subiectis dictorum rationibus* is not a *discipulis* or if the *ablativus absolutus* only belongs to *aetiologiae* (cf. *supra*). Otherwise Quintilian would also include for the *chria* the αἰτία-exercise in the teaching packet of the grammarian.

⁸⁹ These words have troubled more than one scholar. While Radermacher (*M. Fabi Quintiliani Institutionis oratoriae libri XII*, ed. L. Radermacher. Add. et corr. coll. et adi. V. Buchheit [Leipzig 1959 (¹1907)]) considers them a gloss that has to be removed from the text, Volkmann (R. Volkmann, *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in systematischer Übersicht* [Hildesheim 1963 (²1885)]) 35 n. 1) substitutes the reading *chriae* for *thesis* (for the *progygnasma* θέσις cf. *supra*). We agree, however, with

It is clear that Quintilian here has another aspect of the *chria* in mind than its inflectional manipulation. Maybe he is thinking of the αἰτία-exercise, since answering to one of the questions above (*cur?*) also implies giving a reason.⁹⁰ Anyway, as this passage indicates, Quintilian does not seem to be familiar only with the *declinatio chriae*. While reserving this grammatical exercise in particular for the class of the *grammaticus*, he probably assigns the more rhetorical *chria*-exercises to the higher level of the *retor*. Since his main interest is to define clearly the tasks of the grammarian and those of the orator on the domain of the *progymnasmata*, it is not impossible that he divides the *chria* between the teaching packet of the grammar school and that of the oratory school. In fact this is also his way of treating the *narratio*-exercise, as we have seen above (p. 249–250).

It is exactly because of this practical concern of making a neat distinction between two levels of schooling, that *Inst. Or.* 1. 9 together with 2. 4 is an interesting addition to the theoretical definitions and classifications of the progymnastic manuals.⁹¹ As Henderson⁹² acknowledges, Quintilian's discussion in 1. 9 is not simply what O'Neil⁹³ calls "little more than an historical curiosity", but "an early, self-consciously critical approach to progymnastic practice from a point-of-view which is not just that of the literary *Progymnasmata*". Our intention was to unveil one point of this important testimony. We hope that in this way we have not only contributed to a correct understanding of *ratio* in 1. 9. 5, but also reconfirmed Quintilian's importance as a source for both the Greek and the Latin school system.

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Winterbottom (M. Winterbottom, "Some Problems in Quintilian Book Two", *Philologus* 108 [1964] 121), who argues that the text is sound as it stands (cf. also Granatelli [n. 7] 147).

⁹⁰ Compare with Colson (n. 6 [1924]) 118–119; D. L. Clark, *Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education* (New York 1957) 187–188; Winterbottom (n. 89) 121; O'Neil (n. 4) 125–126 and M. Alexandre Júnior, "Importância da *cria* na cultura helenística", *Euphrosyne* 17 (1989) 48. Cf. also Russell (n. 1) 210 n. 4 and 293 n. 18: "because it involves discussing and justifying an authoritative opinion" (our emphasis).

⁹¹ Cf. Henderson (n. 6) 88.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 89.

⁹³ O'Neil (n. 4) 138.

Квинтилиан (*Inst. or.* 1, 9) добавляет к курсу обучения у грамматика элементарные упражнения, которые позднейшая риторическая традиция именует *προϋμνάσματα*: задания возрастающей сложности для подготовки к произнесению речей. Хотя эти упражнения фактически относятся к курсу ратора, в Риме большинство из них, по-видимому, постепенно перешло в ведение грамматика. Однако Квинтилиан возражает против этой практики и рекомендует для грамматической школы только простейшие начальные риторические упражнения. Встающая перед ним при этом практическая задача: провести ясную границу между двумя стадиями обучения – делает *Inst. or.* 1, 9 (вместе с 2, 4, где представлены *προϋμνάσματα*, относящиеся к курсу ратора) интересным дополнением к теоретическим определениям и классификациям упражнений для начинающих в греческих учебниках Теона, (псевдо-)Гермогена, Афтония и Николая. К сожалению, обзор упражнений у Квинтилиана часто настолько краток, что его интерпретация вызывает сложности. В статье предлагается толкование одного из таких неясных пассажей, посвященных упражнению под названием *chria* (1, 9, 5): *in his omnibus (sc. chriis) et declinatio per eosdem ducitur casus et tam factorum quam dictorum ratio est*. Первая часть *in his ... casus* явно относится к склонению хрии по падежам (*κλίσις χρείας*). Но как следует понимать *ratio* во второй части предложения? Ранее предлагались несколько интерпретаций. Авторы статьи считают, что это слово означает систему или метод использования нескольких вводных фраз для склонения хрии. В поддержку этой версии можно привести не только литературные источники, но и некоторые школьные папирусы, показывающие, что заучивание вводных формул и применение их при склонении хрии входило в курс обучения у грамматика.